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The year 2010 was the wettest year on record for Queensland, Australia and the wettest 
year since 1974 for Southeast Queensland. The extremely heavy rain in early January 2011 
fell on the catchments of heavily saturated Brisbane and Stanley Rivers systems resulting in 
significant runoff which rapidly produced a widespread and devastating flood event. The 
area of inundation was equivalent to the total land area of France and Germany combined. 
Over 200,000 people were affected leaving 35 people dead and 9 missing. The damage bill 
was estimated at over $1B and cost to the economy at over $10B with over 30,000 homes and 
6,000 business flooded and 86 towns and regional centres affected.  
The need to disburse disaster funding in a prompt manner to the affected population was 
paramount to facilitate individuals getting their lives back to some normality. However, the 
payout of insurance claims has proved to be a major area of community anger. The ongoing 
impasse in payment of insurance compensation is attributed to the nature and number of 
claims, confusing definition of flooding and the lack or accuracy of information needed to 
determine individually the properties affected and legitimacy of claims. Information was not 
readily available at the micro-level including, extent and type of inundation, flood heights at 
property level and cause of damage. Events during the aftermath highlighted widespread 
community misconceptions concerning the technical factors associated with the flood event 
and the impact of such on access to legitimate compensation and assistance. Individual and 
community wide concerns and frustration, anger and depression, have arisen resulting from 
delays in the timely settlement of insurance claims. Lessons learnt during the aftermath are 
presented in the context of their importance as a basis for inculcating communities impacted 
by the flood event with resilience for the future. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The reconstruction and recovery activities necessitated by the devastating flood and weather events of the 
summer of 2010-11 have presented a unique opportunity to re-build a stronger and more resilient Queensland 
by enhancing the resilience of the community, the economy and the environment. The Queensland Recon-
struction Authority (QRA), established on 21 February 2011, operates under a comprehensive and integrated 
recovery and reconstruction plan for the State – Operation Queenslander:  The State Community, Economic 
and Environmental Recovery and Reconstruction Plan 2011-2013. The mission of QRA is to ‘reconnect, 
rebuild and improve Queensland, its communities and economy’. This is supported by four strategic objec-
tives, two of which specifically focus on resilience: 
o build a resilient Queensland and support resilient Queenslanders; and 
o enhance preparedness and disaster mitigation.1) 
 
Disaster resilience has been defined as, ‘the capacity to prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from the impacts of disasters’ (Figure 1).2) 
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Prevent: The taking of preventative measures to reduce 
the likelihood of an event occurring or, if an event occurs, 
to reduce the severity of the event. 
Prepare: The taking of preparatory measures to ensure 
that, if an event occurs, communities, resources and ser-
vices are able to cope with the effects of the event. 
Respond: 
The taking of appropriate measures to respond to an event, 
including action taken and measures planned in anticipa-
tion of, during and immediately after an event to ensure 
that the effects are minimised and that persons affected by 
the event are given immediate relief and support. 
Recover: The taking of appropriate measures to recover 
from an event, including the action taken to support dis-
aster-affected communities in the reconstruction of infra-
structure, the restoration of emotional, social, economic 
and physical wellbeing and the restoration of the envi-
ronment. 
(State Disaster Management Group, Queensland State 
Disaster Management Plan, 2011) 
 
Figure 1: Resilience in the disaster management cycle3) 
 
Building resilience enhances our ability to minimise the effects of future disaster events on our communities, 
economy and environment. Building disaster resilience for the community is planning ahead to reduce disaster 
risks and produce co-ordinated and effective efforts during disaster events. Betterment is the enhancement of 
the resilience of a resource through a significant improvement or step change in the nature of that resource .4)  
The Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements Determination 2011 describes betterment as the 
repair or replacement of an asset, usually buildings or roads, to ‘a more disaster resilient standard than its 
pre-disaster standard’.5)  
 
In 2001, spatial datasets similar to the datasets provided by the Department of Environment and Resource 
Management (DERM) during the 2010-11 flood and weather events, were accorded the status of a ‘soft’ spatial 
infrastructure by the Commonwealth in the Spatial Information Industry Action Agenda.6) This paper will 
describe how spatial datasets and spatial information were utilised as an infrastructure by emergency man-
agement organizations in preparation for, during and in the aftermath of the Brisbane flood event. The 
shortcomings in the resilience of existent spatial information for flood response is identified as will the po-
tential for its betterment as an infrastructure and driver for the betterment of community resilience in the face 
of future flood and other disaster events. 
 
 
2. SETTING THE SCENE 
 
The year 2010 was the wettest year on record for Queensland State, Australia and the wettest year since 1974 
for Southeast Queensland. The extremely heavy rain in early January 2011 fell on the catchments of heavily 
saturated Brisbane and Stanley Rivers systems resulting in significant runoff which rapidly produced a 
widespread and devastating flood event. The area of inundation was equivalent to the total land area of France 
and Germany combined. Over 200,000 people were affected leaving 35 people dead and 9 missing. The 
damage bill is estimated at over $1B and cost to the economy at over $10B with over 30,000 homes and 6,000 
business flooded and 86 towns and regional centres affected. Figure 2 depicts the modeling of the extent of 
predicted inundation along the floodplain of the Brisbane and Stanley River System.7) 
 
(1) Wivenhoe Dam and false sense of security 
Wivenhoe Dam was built as a response to the 1974 Brisbane floods. When it was completed in 1984, the hope 
was that floods of that magnitude might never happen again. It was believed that the dam would hold back the 
water. During the decade-long drought at the beginning of the millennium, Queensland's focus changed from 
flood mitigation to water security. Wivenhoe has a flood mitigation capacity of 710,000 Olympic-size 
swimming pools. The capacity of drinking water is the worth of 580,000 Olympic pools.8) 
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Figure 2: Flood modeling data (in yellow) 
 
The time lapse of over 35 years following the 1974 Brisbane flood event resulted in a significant dimunition of 
the corporate knowledge held collectively by the community with respect to that earlier event.A series of 
floodplain maps prepared post 1974 primarly for development control purposes were available leading up to 
the 2011 flood event. The series titled, Brisbane River Inundation series at a scale of 1:10,000, and a second 
series, titled the 1974 Flood series at a scale of 1:31,680 had been compiled by interpolation from observations 
taken at a limited set of control points of the likely inundation extent. Both series provide only a generalised 
indication to the potential flood levels in an individual property.9) 
 
(2) Urbanisation compared to 1974 
Significant urbanisation has occurred in the Lower Brisbane River Catchment since the 1974 flood event, but 
the total urbanisation in the catchment is relatively small. Urbanisation can be neglected when assessing flood 
risk on large rivers, but it is important when assessing flooding on small creeks and tributaries.10) 
 
The 1974 flood mainly affected the greater Brisbane area, with around 3% of dwellings, or 8,500 homes, 
inundated. The 2011 flood event affected 4.1% of dwellings in Brisbane, hitting particularly waterfront 
properties in low lying areas. The Queensland Government estimated that around 30,000 homes needed 
complete rebuilding. The experience in the aftermath of the 1974 Brisbane flood indicated no evident causa-
tion from a major flooding event to house prices and rents. However, the higher proportion of households 
affected in the recent floods, and the significantly larger number of houses inundated means that the predica-
tive value of the 1974 data was unclear.11)  Figure 3 depicts Wivenhoe Dam at 197% capacity prior to the 
release of water from the spillway commencing on January 8 2011.12,13)  
 
3. THE FLOOD EVENT OF 2011 
 
Tropical Cyclone Tasha crossed the coast south of Cairns – 1,600 kms north of Brisbane - on December 25 
2010 heading in a southerly direction and by December 31, over 30 regional centres were flood affected. The 
Brisbane River peaked at 4.46m at 3:30pm on January 13. There was a heavy demand for DEM and contour 
information for disaster response activities. The peak height of the 1974 Brisbane flood event was 5.45m.  
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Figure 3: Wivenhoe Dam at 197% capacity 
 
It is estimated that about 26,000 homes were affected when the Brisbane Flood peaked on January 13, 2011.14), 
with about 11,900 properties being fully flooded and about 14,700 partially affected. The figure of 26,000 out 
of 628,000 households was 4.1% of the Brisbane Major Statistical Region.15) Figures 4 and 5 show the aerial 
photographs taken before and close to the peak of the flood event over the Brisbane Metropolitan area.16) 
Figure 6 depicts flood affected towns in SE Queensland by January 14, 2011.17) 
 
4. THE NEED FOR SPATIAL INFORMATION: Respond Phase During the flood event 
 
Spatial information concerning potential inundation extent and height was required during the flood event for 
the coordinated planning and evacuation of neighborhoods and properties and the closure of roads. As aerial 
photography was acquired, the Spatial Information Group (SIG) commenced the digitising of the flood line. 
Using aerial photography taken at and/or shortly after the peak allowed the water or debris line to be accurately 
mapped. SIG staff examined the flood line property by property, which proved to be labour-intensive. The data 
acquisition program captured aerial phoptography over towns at times when peak record flood levels were 
expected. Cloud cover limited flying height and imagery capture at a rapid coverage rate and at an optimum 
resolution. The time lag from capture to final imagery delivery of approximately 10 days was not suited to 
disaster response time lines. Satellite imagery, although of general interest, was not at a spatial resolution 
suitable for the planning and tasking of response activities by Emergency Management Queensland.18) 
 
SIG worked closely with relevant authorities to produce a flood extent map showing the one agreed flood line 
to avoid duplication of effort amongst agencies and to minimise the risk of competing data sets purporting to 
represent the 2011 floods. The flood line and mapping were subsequently used to support the Brisbane City 
Council’s (BCC) Temporary Local Planning Instrument.19) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Brisbane River: before and after the flood event 
 
(1) Community Financial Assistance 
An inundation level just above or below the floor boards became a threshold level for providing financial 
assistance. Emergency assistance payments were available to those whose principal place of residence at the 
time of the floods was inundated with water above the level of the floor in living areas. The payments required 
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significant resources for assessing tens of thousands of applications to ensure that the funds were paid out as 
quickly as possible to assist those affected. It quickly became apparent that there was no complete data set 
which identified all of the flood damaged residences. The Committee distributing relief funds needed to sa-
feguard the integrity of the relief payments by only paying applications where there was sufficient information 
to verify the claim based on best available information at the time the application was lodged.20) 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Brisbane urban area: after flood event 
 
 
Figure 6: Flood affected towns, 14 January 2011 
 
5. THE AFTERMATH: Recover Phase 
 
The Queensland Government established a Commission of Inquiry to examine the 2010/2011 flood disaster 
that had affected 70% of the state. The Terms of Reference provided for an independent examination of events 
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leading to the floods, all aspects of the response and the subsequent aftermath.21) 
 
(1) Raising the Q100 level 
More than 22,000 homes were submersed above their floor boards. Many were considered to be safe having 
been built above the current 100 Year Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) design storm flood level. The 
Commission of Enquiry suggested that significant work is required to review the region’s 100 Year ARI de-
sign storm flood levels in the light of this new information. 
 
The 100 Year ARI flood level is not necessarily the highest flood level in the region. Local authorities set a 
Defined Flood Event based on historical flood levels. These levels are used to inform planning and policy, in 
particular the level that Councils require habitable floors to be built above to provide protection against floods 
up to the magnitude of a Defined Flood Event. Many Councils are revising their 100 Year ARI flood levels as 
a result of the data gathered during the 2011 floods. In particular, Brisbane City Council announced that new 
homes in flood-affected areas will have to be built 800mm to 2m higher to ensure the habitable floor level in a 
flood-prone area is 500mm above the flood level recorded during the 2011 flood event.22) 
 
(2) Surveying and Spatial Sciences Natural Disaster Response Committee 
A Joint Surveying and Spatial Sciences Natural Disaster Response Committee was formed to offer the pro-
fession’s assistance to the Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QRA). The committee noted a number of 
factors that had the potential to impact on reconstruction activities. The key factors included: 
1) The post-Wivenhoe Dam Q100 line in Brisbane does not represent the 1974 flood level. In some areas the 
Q100 + 500mm is a regulatory line which may be exceeded by some Brisbane flood events.  
2) The recent Brisbane flood event was solely a river flood with limited local creek flooding from storm water 
runoff and hence had a different impact to the 1974 flood.  
3) During a major flood, rivers and creeks may have significant hydraulic gradient so that the flood level at 
one point in the watercourse can be significantly higher than the flood level further downstream.  
 
It thus can be inferred that there can be grounds for uncertainty as to what a flood level prediction of maximum 
height would actually mean with respect to an individual’s understanding of the impact on their property. 
 
(3) Spatial data for individual properties 
In their submission to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry dated March 2011, the Queensland 
Surveying and Spatial Sciences Joint Natural Disaster Response Committee identified three issues that every 
Queensland property occupier needed to address.23) The issues were: 1) Is my property in a flood prone area?; 
2) How high will a particular flood come?; 3) What is the likely impact of a particular flood on my property? 
 
The submission postulated that long time (+30 years) occupiers of a property would know the answer to issues 
1 and 3 due to their first-hand knowledge of past floods. However, recent occupants or those considering a 
purchase would not necessarily know or have access to that shared community or other corporate knowledge. 
Issue 2 concerns messages broadcast via the media about predicted flood heights and the general public’s lack 
of understanding how the height expected related to their property. A possible approach is to broadcast mes-
sages providing the expected flood height at a specific geographic location. However, a member of the public 
is unlikely to be able to relate to the likely impact of the flood height on the property they are occupying. 
 
The submission proposed that appropriate signs should be erected at street corners and significant dips on all 
roads subject to flooding. Additionally, the submission proposed that the height of the ground floor of all 
premises in flood prone area to be measured and required to be displayed on the premises. Further, a com-
munication strategy should be in place that would allow an occupier to link a predicted flood height to the local 
information on the proposed street signs. 
 
(4) Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry Final Report 
The Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCI) key recommendations include: 
o Government should ensure the existence and maintenance of a repository of flood related data; 
o Where development is expected to occur, councils should develop maps and maintain flood flow maps and 
have a flood overlay map in their planning schemes; 
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o Councils should ensure that residents and businesses can clearly understand the impact of predicted flood 
levels and that the Maps be interpretable by the public; 
o Make available to the public a ‘real time’ flood mapping product; 
o Flood maps or data are  needed which takes into account sea level rise or the storm surge impacts – fear of 
compensation.24) 
 
In particular, at Appendix 3: Interim Report recommendations, Chapter 4 Forecasts, warnings and information 
4.13, the QFCI report requires Councils ensure that residents and businesses can clearly understand the impact 
of predicted flood levels on their property by adopting one or more of the following methods: 
o information on rates notices about flooding in individual properties; 
o geospatial mapping, available to the public, that depicts inundation at certain river heights; 
o flood markers; 
o flood flag maps and floodwise property reports25);  
o colour coded maps.26) 
 
6. THE NEED FOR SPATIAL INFORMATION: Prevent Phase - During the aftermath 
 
DERM assigned priority to completing flood lines and flood extent maps as soon as possible after spatial 
imagery became available. Aerial photography was acquired for 187 towns and suburbs in Queensland and 
flood lines produced for 115. DERM attempted to map flood lines from all aerial photography taken, but in 
many cases a flood line could not be discerned. This was usually due to imagery being acquired too long after 
the flood peak. Figure 7 depicts the debris line used in mapping the flood inundation extent in the Brisbane 
metropolitan area and a comparison between observed line and predicted line from BCC flood modelling.27) 
 
 
Figure 7: Debris line used to map floodline 
 
Information related to previous floods was used to create the Interim Floodplain area. The information 
included aerial photography and satellite imagery of the 2010/2011 flood event and highest recorded data from 
DERM gauging stations. It also included evidence of vegetation and soils typically associated with 
floodplains.  
 
DERM’s expectation is that future flood occurrence to fall within the Interim Floodplain area. However, it is 
possible for larger floods to exceed this area. Local Authority knowledge and verification/amendment of the 
mapping is very important given the methodology used and noting that the mapping was not checked in the 
field. The QRA toolkit makes it clear that the Floodplain Mapping should be considered as Level 1 in a flood 
maturity mapping model, where Level 0 is a Council with no flood mapping. Level 2 would be achieved by a 
Council verifying and validating the mapping. This could include incorporation of higher quality (localised) 
data and/or amending the Floodplain Mapping Area through the application of local knowledge. 
 
(1) Future Research and Development  
Based on the experiences of the 2010-11 flood event, DERM has proposed research activities to produce 
datasets and models to facilitate visualization of evolving flood events, provide situational awareness and 
support informed decision making. The activities include: 
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o Development of a facility to ‘layer’ in flood lines and model predictions; 
o Investigation of potentially varying floodline and floodplain mapping and visualisation techniques for the 
disparate problems of urban and rural areas; 
o Investigation of the utilisation of high resolution data (Lidar) and rigorous survey and image capture 
techniques for the determination of first floor building levels. 
 
Figure 9 depicts a flood height and its level in relation to first floor clearance above ground level. An insurance 
claim lodged by the middle house, would not be compensated to the same degree as the two houses on either 
side. The community’s apparent lack of understanding of the difference between the definition of ‘inundation’ 
and ‘flooding’ in insurance policies  has been the root cause of frustration and anger with the delay in settling 
of insurance claims. The DERM research proposes a web-based facility to allow all stakeholders with an in-
terest in a property to visualize the predicted or actual floodline in context as shown in Figure 9.28) 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Floodline and first floor ground clearance 
 
(2) Insurance Claims and Evaluation 
The settlement of insurance claims became a serious and ongoing source of frustration for both policy holders 
and insurance companies. Due to lack of certainty as to whether a property was covered under the terms of the 
insurance policy, many claims are still outstanding over twelve months after the Brisbane flood event. This 
state of non-closure has created on-going and widespread social problems. Stakeholders, both insured and 
uninsured at the time of the flood event are relying on the release of the Queensland Floods Commission of 
Enquiry Final Report on March 16 to provide evidence for the resolution of outstanding claims and for access 
to other sources for compensation of losses. Unfortunately, spurious and vexatious insurance claims have 
confused and delayed the settling of genuine claims. 
 
Work undertaken at QUT produced a map of insurance claims shown in relation to the floodline for one of the 
worst affected suburban areas in Brisbane. The research used datasets provided by DERM and duplicated the 
departmental procedure for investigation of claims across the flood affected areas of Brisbane. Claims were 
evaluated and mapped using spatial analysis procedures against four compliance values. The ranges of com-
pliance values were for claims: Outside floodline; Inside floodline (depth undetermined); Inside floodline 
(depth 0-3m); Inside floodline (depth > 3m). The depth component was a determining indicator for compliance 
as first floor level in the Brisbane area have traditionally been built at 2.4m clearance above ground level. This 
level – habitable floor level – was a criterion to determine eligibility for emergency financial assistance 
available from the Premier’s Flood Relief Appeal. 
Figure 10 depicts the map of properties for which insurance and financial assistance claim were lodged versus 
the mapped floodline within the research area. 
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Figure 10: Claim versus floodline – Brisbane 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has reviewed the usage and limitations of spatial information in its role as a ‘soft’ infrastructure 
during and in the aftermath of the Brisbane 2011 flood event. Principle amongst lessons learnt is the impor-
tance of an authoritative record of the event to serve as ‘point of truth’ in support of decision making for a 
coordinated and timely response by emergency management organisations for recovery, relief, insurance, 
reconstruction operations and in the preparation phase for future natural disaster events. A complete and timely 
capture of imagery is critical for flood plain mapping, catchment modeling and future inundation prediction. 
High resolution imagery and elevation data is important for the determination of the flood line and inundation 
extent and depth, particularly because of the more closed nature of the urban environment. Floor heights are 
central in determining the eligibility of flood affected properties for the receipt of emergency assistance and for 
the timely verification and settlement of insurance claims. 
 
However, the paramount lesson learnt has been the need to, in an evolving disaster situation, make information 
available, publish early whilst still accepting feedback to facilitate dynamic update. The betterment of com-
munity resilience will occur if a member of the public is able to unambiguously visualise the disaster risk to 
their own property. Engaging the public is encouraged and the desired outcome and consequence of the proper 
implementation of all lessons learnt, will drive the development of community resilience based on access to 
specific contextual spatial information during a disaster event such as the 2011 Brisbane flood. 
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